Teju Cole’s Open City and the Ultimate Unreliable Narrator

**Disclaimer: Though Teju Cole’s novel has been out for over ten years now, I still feel obliged to post a warning that this article will contain spoilers as well as sensitive content about sexual violence.**

Early in Teju Cole’s Open City, the narrator, Julius, ends one of his meandering walks through Manhattan by visiting an old, ailing professor he has kept in touch with. As the two chat about early English literature and a patient of Julius’ who faces a dilemma from his conservative Christian family, the open window lets in sounds of the New York City marathon. This vibrant swathe of life, with so many details and specifics swirling in a small space, is representative of the whole book. Julius spends his life ambling through other lives, colliding with humans from all over the world, no matter where he happens to be. His mind is an open receptacle for minutiae about classical music and painting, critical and political theory, and the experiences of others – though not, we start to realize, in equal measure.


There are superbly done episodes in this book, in which Julius converses with a prisoner from Liberia, an older woman from the intellectual scene in Belgium, and a young man studying critical theory while working in an internet cafe, among others. The world opens up in these passages, thrillingly, filled in with copious details of the cosmopolitan and many-layered world of identity, language, history, literature, politics, and seemingly anything at all. The details make these passages feel like sitting in on a college lecture in a class which one isn’t taking for a grade: one gets to simply dip one’s foot into the rich river of ideas and experiences.

There’s a sense of oddness, however, that begins to build as the novel progresses. Julius is a psychologist near the end of his training, and yet few of his many musings involve human psychology or reference the vast academic field he is professionally training in. This could be chalked up to Julius wanting to pursue other interests outside of work, and yet a mind as curious as his would seem to want to meditate on whatever it was pointed toward, indiscriminately. So why does he meditate so rarely on human motivation, on emotions, on what makes people tick? Instead, he seems to dwell in a curious state of absence when it comes to other people. Early in the novel, he meets his neighbor and learns that the neighbor’s wife has died recently, and he “had known nothing of it.” During another visit to his professor friend, he “[becomes] like one who was no longer there” and “continue[s] the conversation…while perfectly distracted”. His romantic relationship fades away like a wave receding. He seems to dance around people, rather than connecting with them. His preference for facts and details about the history of classical music, say, over a curiosity about others’ emotional lives, becomes telling.

As Julius’ own backstory becomes clear, it adds to this sense of his detachment from others. His Nigerian father’s death of tuberculosis left him and his German mother disconnected, “our stoicism…disunited”, “our glances full of dark rooms.” In a moment of vulnerability, his mother attempts to connect with Julius by telling him the story of her childhood, but Julius “had no feeling for the stories she was telling or the longing behind them.” He says, “I couldn’t see why she was telling me about her girlhood, about pianos and blueberries.” His relationship with his mother has broken down, but it’s not clear why. Halfway through the book, Julius decides to travel to Brussels to find his grandmother, though he has no real way to find her, not having her info and not wanting to contact his mother. In fact, he doesn’t know if she’s still alive. It seems that the search for his grandmother was an excuse to travel, since he never makes more than meager attempts to look her up.

These incidents add up as the details pour in, with no indication towards any particular angle or direction of the plot; the book appears to be merely incidental in nature, until one particular subplot finds its conclusion. A woman named Moji, whom Julius knows from years ago in Nigeria, meets Julius again as an adult in New York, and they start an ambiguous friendship. Near the very end of the novel, Moji reveals what has motivated her this whole time: she has wanted to talk to him about the time he took advantage of her, when she was drunk at a party during their adolescence. 

The revelation of this narrator as a rapist is jarring enough, but then, in the most brazen use of narrator unreliability I have ever seen, Julius simply relates Moji’s accusation and her feelings about it directly, with zero commentary. He hears what she has to say, leaves the scene, and does not mention it again. Instead, he returns to his musings and meanderings.

This twist, so late in the novel, turns the book on its head. It affects the entire character, the entire book – in fact, it threatens to swallow them. Moji’s accusation hinges on the fact that she knows he will not want to acknowledge what happened in any way, will not want to hear her or process her story or her pain – and this is exactly what happens. Cole gives us no reason to mistrust Moji’s account, and every reason to doubt Julius. The reader might recall other incidents of Julius ignoring women’s pain, such as the attempted bonding with his mother, as well as an earlier incident when Julius was riding in a car to school and the driver hit and possibly killed a young girl. Years later, Julius thinks of the incident as “something I had dreamed about, or heard in a telling by someone else.” His dissociative pattern has become clear.

Though it’s a fascinating way to structure a novel, forcing us to radically reasses the character of the narrator we’ve been listening to for hundreds of pages, somewhat like a detective sizing up a suspect after hearing about the murder, this device unfortunately rests on the dismissal of women’s pain. This is why it brings the book down with more weight than it can carry. Cole’s novel can be seen as a study of the absence at the center of a person’s character, the avoidance one cultivates in order to maintain daily functioning, but the use of Moji’s rape to achieve this leaves a bad taste in one’s mouth. Moji’s whole point is that her experience has been erased, because of Julius’ lack of acknowledgment, and the book simply re-enacts this erasure. In fact, in reviews of this book, many reviewers shy away from mentioning this crucial plot point (perhaps to avoid spoiling it), which effaces and diminishes Moji’s pain even further, burying it under observations about the novel’s intellectual style and subject matter. 

True, Moji is a fictional character, and can’t be hurt by reviews of the book. But her experience is common enough among real women, who have had their stories erased and their truths invalidated by others. It’s hard to stomach this being used as a plot device, which deepens Julius’ character at the cost of Moji’s pain. If the erasure of women’s pain is a set of narratives that already exist plentifully in the real world, what exactly is the purpose of putting that narrative down on paper yet again, without changing or challenging it? Why reify it by giving it yet another voice? Why not write something else?

Azareen Van Der Vliet Oloomi’s Savage Tongues Goes Back to Where It Happened and Finds the Self

The longer you live, the more you understand the importance of The Place Where It Happened, whether it’s the best thing that ever happened to you, or the worst. I started staging my own re-visitings young, even as an eleven-year-old child, looking back at my elementary school playground with a world-weariness more appropriate to someone in middle age. Over the years, I’ve re-visited the sites of breakups, apartments and rooms where many emotional growing pains occurred, or just the park I was sitting in when I talked to someone important for the first time. It all happened right there, I would think to myself, as though the very physical matter of the place held a special charge.

It’s a particular sort of attachment we have as humans, one which is explored with great sensitivity and intelligence in Azareen Van Der Vliet Oloomi’s novel, Savage Tongues. Whether it’s us doing the attaching, or the place attaching to us, is in some ways the novel’s central question. Can the narrator, who was in an abusive relationship at the young age of seventeen, free herself from the snares of memory and reclaim The Place Where It Happened? Using a simple, straightforward travel narrative as its base, the beautifully nuanced novel traces Arezu’s journey back to the infamous apartment in Spain, where she stays for several weeks with her best friend as moral support. This narrative structure proves to be an excellent scaffolding for the onslaught of sensations and memory that assault (pun intended) Arezu as she travels forward in place but backward in time.

It’s a thrill to read a narrator so viscerally and electrically connected to her own feelings and thoughts; the inner drama which unfolds is as vast as it is filled-in with images, recalled lines of dialogue, and perhaps most importantly, sense-memory. The physical sensations involved in this re-visiting and remembering constitute a narrative in themselves, and Van Der Vliet Oloomi pays them the dutiful attention of an investigative journalist, exposing the nature of trauma and the multi-dimensionality of relationships.

What this novel reveals is that the narrative of place and trauma is one of revisiting and re-envisioning.

There are multiple steps involved in the re-visiting process. The memory of the first time we were there, when we originally went through the event, creates the first layer, upon which years of experience have sedimented. This first-layer memory, like many first impressions, already contains a whole system of components and distorting factors. As Arezu explains:

“It had taken me twenty years to understand that the lens through which Omar had seen me was so wretched, so disgraceful, so disenfranchising, it had robbed me of my ability to see in return: I had lost the power to look. And because I had lost my ability to look, I had lost the ability to see myself clearly. Where then would I speak from? How would I retell my story? I had lost my descriptive capacities. He had reshaped my identity in his image, with his gaze.” (6)

Arezu must re-envision her experience of the event, this time without the abuser’s gaze dominating. Omar’s gaze is still present for the older Arezu, of course, but it has been folded into the mix of time and memory. Meanwhile, to acknowledge even more complexity, the idea of Omar’s gaze has become a new wrinkle in the new re-envisioning, a concept which Arezu could not be conscious of the first time she experienced the event.

While the seventeen-year-old may have been at least partly a blank slate onto which Omar was able to project his perspectives and emotions, the thirty-something Arezu is not. The older self catches up to the younger self in time, each adjusting in order to come to some sort of fundamental agreement. The guilt or complicity of the seventeen-year-old Arezu comes into question, as the nuanced vision of an older woman gives dimensions to the simpler, younger perspective. The novel creates this multiplicity of selves with effective use of imagery and symbolism (most memorably involving a young pig which was killed carelessly by Omar).

In this way, the sensation of moving forward and backward in time results: not only is one’s current self reaching back in time, but the past self is brought forward, into the current emotional moment. This effect highlights exactly how, when it comes to The Place Where It Happened, the sense of place warps time, in multiple directions. This constantly shifting field of events and places and the various perspectives they create calling to each other across time could be argued to constitute the real self, which, if we are aware of it, might give us some tiny modicum of choice over how we exist as selves. To return to the Place Where It Happened, to see with your own eyes, layering the previous perspectives with the current one: this is the defense, as Arezu says, against the self-obliterating effect of the world and its language.

The Moral Universe of A Wonderful Life

I finished the annual viewing of It’s A Wonderful Life several weeks ago, of course (it’s a Christmas Eve tradition), but wanted to write a little on what I noticed this time around. One of my favorite things about this film is how many repeat viewings it can withstand; I literally don’t ever watch it without noticing some new moment or detail. It’s an incredibly fully-realized story-world.

This time, perhaps because I’ve been watching the working man’s rage draw closer and closer to a boiling point with recent events, I observed a thing or two about everyone’s favorite Grinch, Mr. Potter. Of course, he’s worse than just a Grinch; the film makes it clear that Mr. Potter’s domination of Bedford Falls’ economy is actually, materially dangerous to its citizens, which in turn increases the heroism of our man George Bailey. Watching them battle is one of the chief pleasures of the film, ever more gratifying the older I get and the more knowledgeable about worldly issues. Jimmy Stewart’s poignant pleas for just a little decency for the working man soothe a sense of complaint that still rankles, ever more so because it’s never directly addressed in contemporary society, squelched by the super-charged corporate behemoth. “Is it too much to have them work and pay and live and die in a couple of decent rooms and a bath?” is the barest, most honest of requests, one that any viewer would have trouble looking down on.

Mr. Potter, of course, remains obdurate. Lionel Barrymore perfects an expression of utter implacability, as though his body is a shield repelling George Bailey’s outflowing of emotion. (I tried to find the best picture to represent this.) At several points in the film, both George and his father Peter speculate on why Potter is such a “hard character.” The conclusion they come up with is that Potter is “sick in his mind, sick in his soul if he has one” and George adds, to Potter’s face, that Potter is “talking about something you can’t get your fingers on, and it’s galling you.” This seems to be the conclusion of the film as well: that Potter is missing something essential in his life, which the Baileys have in spades. That is, love and community.

This is all pretty clear from watching the film, but what struck me this time was that it’s not at all clear that any of that speculation about Potter is actually true. There is zero indication in the film that what Mr. Potter really wants is to be loved, like the Grinch or Ebeneezer Scrooge. Perhaps, you could argue, this is because Potter has never experienced anyone being loving toward him, and therefore doesn’t know what he’s missing out on; that could be a valid argument. I could easily imagine a spin-off movie about Potter which attempts to psychologize and locate his trauma, thereby “unlocking” his sense of kindness. Thankfully, the film doesn’t go anywhere in this direction (so there’s at least one way in which it is realistic and not overly sentimental).

Because of this personality difference (or whatever you want to call it), the on-screen ideological battles between George and Potter are massively one-sided. Only one of the parties in the argument really tries to make a case; the other side just folds his arms and frowns. Potter not only doesn’t care about George’s lofty ideas of decency and camaraderie, he doesn’t dignify them with any kind of response, let alone an equally impassioned one. The way Lionel Barrymore plays Potter, he is not a man without passion; his stony face is often animated with amusement or chagrin. He just doesn’t, for most of the film, care to engage in the verbal back-and-forth, except for the part when he calls George a “warped, frustrated young man.” His battle is not one of words; it’s one of pure, cold capital.

If what the Baileys believed was true, that Potter just needs love and community to make him less of a “hard character,” this would be a hopeful vision; in fact, it would seem to solve the vast majority of relationship problems. Throw love at someone, and watch them become kind. But I see no indication that this is the case with Potter. It looks more like the Baileys projecting their moral values onto a person who has nothing to do with them at all. In truth, Potter doesn’t care a whit about winning a moral victory. The only time he seems to have any feeling about the Baileys besides sneering dismissal and annoyance is when he sees George in real financial trouble near the end of the film. At this point, Potter comes alive with competitive fervor, like a shark activated by the hint of blood (“Happy New Year to you – in jail!”). Finally, his war might be won: George might be financially ruined and have no chance of interfering with Potter’s takeover of the economy.

The mischaracterization of Potter by the Baileys struck me as an important lesson, namely the futility of trying to fight a moral battle against a party whose priorities and values are not even in the same universe as yours. Many of us find ourselves drowning in outrage every time we open the news or social media, exposed to points of view that seem so abhorrent as to be impossible. We expect our own values to triumph, simply because they are our values and therefore self-evidently good. The result is that we give away too much energy to this outrage, or we twist ourselves into pretzels trying to understand and empathize, rather than simply dealing with the facts as they are. This emotional energy would be far better used to nurture and tend to our own moral values, and to extend them where they might meet an open recipient. Potter is not such a person.

As long as the Baileys can’t truly understand Potter’s lack of interest in anything but financial victory, and continue to consider him part of the same moral universe (albeit on the opposite side), he wins. The movie resolves with one of the most touching scenes of all time, a loving community coming together (one can only dream of such a thing happening these days!), and leaves us to assume that Potter is sitting, defeated and lonely, in his cold office. But Potter as he is portrayed in this film is immune to such “sentimental hogwash.” Rather, he’s probably being rolled around his cold office, planning his next move, invigorated by the new level of challenge before him.

George Saunders’ Story Machines

When I was in college, I took a class on Chekhov’s short stories. The model of this class was very much in the “reading like a writer” school: we read the works of this Russian master, and tried to absorb osmotically what he had done. Chekhov, like pretty much all writers I studied in college, was a genius of a very mysterious sort; the stories worked, but I wasn’t really privy to how. Each story seemed to be one indissoluble whole, a monolith dropped from space, glowing and impenetrable. The class was like touring a church in order to praise the results of its magnificent construction, and be humbled by its grandness. I developed a sense of what felt “Chekhovian”: namely, forlorn peasants lamenting their little, unexciting lives, constantly wanting “to live, only to live!” and falling victim to absurd setbacks. My sense of the Chekhovian was strong enough to write an imitation story, which was fun, though of course it was only superficially similar; I had no ability to imitate the intricacies of his mechanics.

That’s fine; it was an undergraduate class, and I was still a freshman. But as my education progressed, the technique of simply observing the masters didn’t seem to vary. It became more and more apparent to me that this technique of aspirational osmosis was the only one that would be used, and I wondered exactly how far it would take me. I wanted to dig in and find what stories were really made of, but I didn’t have the tools. I was like a biology student unable dissect the dead frog on the table, because I had no scalpel; all I could do was marvel at it from a short distance.

George Saunders, A Swim in a Pond in the Rain, Random House, 2021

George Saunders dissects seven classic, Russian short stories, including three by Chekhov, in his newest book, A Swim in a Pond in the Rain, and gives us our own sharp scalpels for future use. My impression of Saunders, as a writer and as a person I’ve met a couple of times, is that he is unflaggingly generous. In essence, this book is a written version of a graduate writing course, which is a huge boon to the hundreds of us who wanted to work with him as MFA students but didn’t get into the program. The structure of the book, which offers the text of the short story and accompanying analysis (sometimes interspersed with the story text), is a brilliant way to ground the analysis, which might otherwise drift off into the abstract, like so many works of literary theory. We always have Saunders’ kind, encouraging, funny, curious voice to return to. The book felt, for me, like a gift. I only wish it had been around when I was an undergraduate, anxiously circling the temple of fiction but unable to get in.

Saunders’ basic approach is less “reading like a writer” and more, perhaps, writing like a reader. That is, Saunders takes a mindfulness-oriented approach toward these Russian masters, and diligently tracks in great detail what happens in his mind (and his students’) during the process of reading them. With the story as the anchor, Saunders shows just how far you can extrapolate with basic observation, which turns out to be amazingly far. He uses these Russian short stories to dig as deep as possible into what a story actually is: an “organic whole [which]…responds alertly to itself” (29); a “system for the transfer of energy” (35); a “limited set of elements that we read against one another” (48); a “set of incremental pulses” (60). It’s quite the same as the biology student using the particular frog carcass to extrapolate what the frog form is in general, and yet, for some reason, throughout my education it seemed like professors shied away from this sort of thing. There is still plenty of remaining belief that art ought to remain mysterious and unexplained. But the short stories Saunders dissects here still have plenty left to admire after the dissection is over; the little systems created within them do their job well enough that they point outward, to the overall strangeness of existence.

The most interesting thing I noted about Saunders’ pronouncements was the metaphor of energy which popped up over and over. It reminded me of Viktor Shklovsky’s explanation of the “energy of delusion”, a fascinating if somewhat nebulous idea. Saunders tends to view a story as a machine or as a phenomenon of physics (including the metaphor he’s used in a previous work, of a story as a little Hot Wheels track), filled with dynamic movement. The funny thing about this is that, in my Chekhov class, I saw his stories as mostly plot-less; they felt like people just doing a lot of traveling and talking (which, to be clear, was a plus for me). Saunders shows just how much movement there is in every beat of a Chekhov story, and I’m grateful for his incisive instruction.

There is still a division between literary fiction and popular storytelling; the latter operates on rules which are pretty recognizable if you care to look. The basic rhythm of set-up and payoff has become so familiar that we instantly sense when an ending is unsatisfying, or the TV show we’ve watched leaves too many “loose ends.” This setup/payoff dynamic is the dominant principle of story writing as we experience it in our daily lives, as consumers of mass media. Saunders’ analysis mostly hews to this, but adds more complexity, particularly in the chapters on Gogol’s “The Nose” and Chekhov’s “Gooseberries”. This marriage of more “basic” storytelling technique with explanations of more complex phenomena like omission and non-realism shows how compatible the two areas really are. There is no need, in my opinion, to exclude elementary concepts like setup/payoff from academic literary analysis. They are quite modifiable and expandable.

There were a couple of times I found myself twitching while reading, particularly in Saunders’ analysis of Tolstoy, which hinges around the unfortunate concept of “truth.” Saunders presents the idea that part of the appeal of a short story is whether it seems to reflect reality in some “true” fashion to the reader. However, when Saunders references Nabokov’s quote about Tolstoy’s “accuracy of perception” (219), I had to cringe. As Saunders himself points out, Tolstoy was notoriously terrible in his treatment of his wife, overly admiring of meekly suffering peasants, and kind of a jerk in general. But this isn’t just a minor personality flaw – he can be argued to be, according to our modern understanding, classist and misogynist. Saunders addresses this when he explains that problems in a story that appear to be about sexism can be rendered as “neutral, more workable technical observations” (246) – but why? I’m not sure why one would want or need to do this. Why can’t the study of fiction writing include observations about the sociological biases present? Why are these separated out of the discussion? It feels like a cop-out.

I’m not suggesting canceling Tolstoy; I’m suggesting we take these dusty old concepts of “truth” and “greatness” down from the pedestals they’ve been on. At one point, Milan Kundera is quoted speaking about “every true novelist” (220) – what exactly is a “true” novelist? I worry that this term is presented as something vague and ambiguous (like obscenity, you “know it when you see it”), but actually refers to something quite specific: “truth” comes from educated, European-descended men. Tolstoy’s “truth” might feel noble and right to him, but I squirm when it is presented as some kind of collective truth, unearthed by a “great” mind. These discussions of “truth” and “greatness,” as general qualities of good art should, I think, be thrown out the window.

There is another squishy concept sloshing around in the book, which is the “feel” a writer uses to decide what moves to make in a story. Saunders writes: “My experience is that, late in the game, finishing a story, we’re in such deep relation to it that we’re making decisions we’re not even aware we’re making, for reasons too fine to articulate…We’re operating in an intuitive zone, deciding quickly, without much deliberation” (109). There is certainly something to be said for this, because no matter how much you describe even the most minute patterns of your mind, there is always a massive remainder of material that you cannot possibly be conscious of, simply because there is too much. The quantity of single thoughts in every instant of human consciousness is staggering, producing a constant zone of neural activity that must remain semi-conscious or even totally unconscious, which becomes “intuition.” Certain artists like David Lynch take great advantage of this, while others try to assign more familiar structure to their work. But no artist, no human, is capable of minding every single thought he has. Which is good, because it dispels the fear of over-explaining fiction, like the fear of ruining a good joke by pulling it apart.

My anxiety about this vague concept of a writer’s “feel” is essentially the same as the one I have about “truth” – that it’s a specific, contingent set of ideas meant to be presented as universal. The discussion of storytelling as an art would ideally include analysis of who gets to tell stories and who doesn’t, which stories are typically put forth as great or noble, and which stories are usually derided or criticized. Saunders has offered us so much in this book that it feels a little unfair to assign this task to him as well. The conversation has already been greatly advanced, in my opinion, by this truly excellent book on craft; the next step may be to find a way to address these problems of supposed universality as embodied by stale concepts like “greatness”.* Speaking personally, and going back to my memories of being a curious but unfulfilled undergrad, I know how damaging they can be to the young and easily-influenced. In general, though, Saunders has done more here to debunk the idea of mysterious, untouchable “genius” than most, showing us a set of comprehensible principles that can be adapted and manipulated. Though I wish this book had been around twenty years ago, I’m more than happy to have it now.

* In fact, writers like Matthew Salesses and Felicia Rose Chavez have already taken on the task of addressing cultural context within the teaching of writing, and I intend to write about them in future blog posts.

I’m Thinking of Thinking: Charlie Kaufman’s I’m Thinking of Ending Things

image I blatantly stole off Google images

Though I am the most devout of Charlie Kaufman fans, this film mostly escaped my attention until now, as a result of the craziness that was 2020. I also, like many during that time, subconsciously veered away from films and books that seemed too bleak and mood-altering; however, I was pleasantly surprised that the film managed to be both creepy and hilarious. The acting was uniformly fantastic, with Toni Collette nearly threatening to steal the film as the mother, and the casting of David Thewlis as a down-home Oklahoma farmer was, for me, a punchline in itself.

But as a long-time Kaufman fan, I was struck most this time by how his work has evolved for me over the approximately 20 years (shit I’m old) I’ve been following him. Back in grad school, we used to talk about the idea that a good experimental story would teach you how to read it. That is, it would give you the tools, conceptual or linguistic or both, that you needed to understand it. Like all dictums in art, this is not applicable in every single instance, but I noticed a remarkable example in Kaufman’s films of how a storyteller has taught me to read his work.

Kaufman’s films always take place at least partially inside the mind, which is where all purported “reality” takes place anyway – Kaufman is just being more upfront and honest about it. In earlier films he toyed with this concept in various ways. In Being John Malkovich there was literally a portal into someone else’s brain, of course, so large parts of the story took place inside John Malkovich’s brain. The resulting scenes could look like anything from first-person banality (experience being John Malkovich rehearsing lines for a Chekhov play!), or could escalate into an insanely original, dramatic sequence like the one where Lottie chases Maxine through John Malkovich’s subconscious.

When an author tinkers with reality, they typically want to let the viewer or reader know what the rules of this particular universe are. In films like BJM and Eternal Sunshine we had characters helpfully explaining, in brief lines, what was happening. In the sequence mentioned above, the rule of John Malkovich’s brain-portal has been violated: Lottie and Maxine have rushed into the portal when someone was already in there. Hence, they are booted to the subconscious. We might possibly have figured this out, but in case we didn’t, Lottie briefly explains to Maxine where they are. The two characters somehow escape John Malkovich’s subconscious by bursting out the door of a school bus, the logic of which is not explained, but at the time I didn’t much mind: the film had established enough of a conceptual rule (and even a rule for when that rule was violated) that I felt it had earned what happened. (I was not conscious of this thinking at the time; I simply didn’t get knocked out of the story, unlike how Maxine and Lottie were knocked out of John Malkovich’s brain.)

In Eternal Sunshine, the story took place partly in Joel’s brain, which was being altered (“it basically is brain damage”) so that he could forget Clementine – specifically, it took place in his memory. So the hippocampus, I suppose. (I like the idea of writing this into the script: “SETTING: JOEL’S HIPPOCAMPUS”.) In some of these scenes, Joel is a passive witness to his own past, narrating over his own memories. Another rule is that the characters in the memories can’t see him (similar to John Malkovich’s subconscious). Then this rule is bent, though not quite broken, when Clementine shows up in Joel’s memories and becomes aware, along with him, of what’s happening.

Once again, there is a dramatic sequence in which two characters are “awake” inside the mind, as they try to halt the erasing process from inside. Once again, the characters are helpful in letting the viewer know the rules of the process, and where they are, in this neurologically-generated universe: they explain where in Joel’s memory they are, and how they might escape the “eraser guys” by hiding out in a memory that the guys won’t get to, i.e. one without Clem.

Fast forward to 2020, and the new film, I’m Thinking of Ending Things. Kaufman has become so familiar and adept with his unique way of constructing story that he skips nearly all explanation to the viewer. The indeterminacy is just occurring in front of us, in many fascinating sequences: the main character’s name is indeterminate, the dog seems to blip in and out of reality (and when he’s there, is only seen shaking himself off, a perpetual blur), the bandage on Jake’s father’s head changes sides, etc. More tellingly, words and ideas once expressed by one character are shown to have originated somewhere else, authored by a completely different person. Whose words and ideas are they, then?

We know, from being assiduous Kaufman fans, that this story is taking place inside someone’s mind, or something like that – but whose mind?

Just the fact that this question popped into my head partway into the film shows you how well Kaufman has taught me to read his work. It also shows his progression as an artist. The switch from using characters to call out the concepts and conceits in his stories, to simply having them happen with no explanation, moves him from the rank of a highly talented magical realist, to that of a masterful artist like Gogol or Lynch or even Joyce, whose disruptions and reinventions of consensus reality are so complex and so thorough that they truly create a separate universe of their own which cannot be simply explained by some quirky “rules.”

But back to the actual question: whose POV is this? Because someone is warping the narrative; this is not objective reality, nor is it a universe in which all characters notice the strangeness – only Lucy notices. Normally, this would make Lucy the POV character. In addition, the narrative begins with her internal monologue, which also would seem to establish her as the POV character. However, her thoughts are inconsistent: she can’t be sure what her name is, and deeper into the movie she begins to slip in and out of other personalities, without seeming to be aware of it. So her control over the POV of the story has ebbed away. And so now who is the one whose mind we’re inside, as we were inside John Malkovich’s, and inside Joel’s?

The answer to this becomes clear midway through the film, and we realize that we have been watching a POV-within-a-POV, à la Craig going into John Malkovich’s mind through the portal (or actually, more like Malkovich going through his own portal). One character has, through some magic, managed to do the impossible, and actually enter another’s subjective reality – the dream, for a storyteller and fiction writer. But the trip is ultimately unsuccessful, and falls apart.

The novel thing about I’m Thinking of Ending Things is that this is done with hardly any explicit mention of the sleight-of-hand happening in front of us. It’s true that the characters do have some philosophical discussions which veer toward an answer, but it’s a far cry from lines in earlier movies which directly tell us whose subconscious we are in. We have to feel the answers intuitively, and even when we manage to see what’s going on, the narrative will not hold us steadily in a comfortable position. It keeps shifting, restlessly, not wanting to settle on any pat formation of what is truly chaotic and infinitely complex (the mind). Eventually, the story floats off into the ether, but even then there is consistency of character and at least some plausible explanation of what happens in the ending. However, there’s also a delightful amount of room for interpretation.

By doing this, Kaufman has shifted from making films about the question of point-of-view, to making a film which actually enacts the dilemma of point-of-view. (A discussion for another time would be how using another’s story, by Iain Reed, as a basis allowed him to do this.) What does it mean to be a character in someone else’s narrative? Earlier films posed this question in their own ways, and characters acted it out on screen; but in I’m Thinking of Ending Things, we see the question become part of the form of the film itself. The question is irreducible and inseparable from the form of the story: in other words, the film itself is the question. It poses other questions as well (how do we create the narratives that make up our identity? how do those narratives change over time? etc.), but those questions are dramatically portrayed, rather than actually altering the form of the story.

Perhaps Kaufman is no longer interested, as I am increasingly no longer interested, in setting up rules for a surrealistic narrative (no matter how wild and innovative that narrative is) and fulfilling them. Perhaps it becomes more interesting to see how lost you can get in the weeds, without completely losing sight of the original path. For some this results in a maddening indeterminacy (when you Google the title of the film, the auto-complete suggests “ending explained”). For others it’s a relief from predictability, and a celebration of the singularity of each creative mind.

A Children’s Bible, Leave the World Behind, and inter-generational responsibility

Just by total coincidence, the last two novels I read have been about the end of society. Or maybe it’s not so remarkable a coincidence, given that this particular eventuality has loomed larger in most of our minds lately. The timing seems serendipitous to us, the readers, but both of these books were composed pre-pandemic, of course. So their writers benefited from a synchronicity of world events and publication dates. That, or there are no real coincidences.


In Lydia Millet’s A Children’s Bible, the societal collapse takes the form of environmental catastrophe, the massive storm near the beginning setting into motion a chain of events in which modern human systems break down, and older, tribal survival modes return. Rumaan Alam’s Leave the World Behind is more of a literary thriller which earns its suspense by mostly withholding the exact nature of the disaster, but it appears to be at the same level of epoch-ending chaos. In both stories, families are holed up in rented vacation homes as the apocalypse descends around them. (I swear I did not choose these together on purpose!)


A Children’s Bible gave me everything I could hope for in a novel. Smart, pithy sentences (the book is narrated by a very world-wise teenager named Eve), well-paced action, interesting characters with fun dialogue, all the rest. But the book reaches deeper even beyond these considerable strengths to form a rich, resonant root system of allegory and fable.


There’s Eve’s name, of course, and her younger brother Jack, who reads a children’s version of the Bible obsessively as the world around him falls apart. Jack’s ardent dedication to saving animals from the human-created environmental disaster takes its place in the larger allegory between climate change and the story of the flood. But Millet is too smart to simply bang us over the head with this parallel. Not only is the parallel pointed out already by the characters in the book, signifying that Millet considers it not so precious that it must be kept from the reader, but the story of A Children’s Bible goes on much longer than Noah’s, into other Bible stories (there are amusing allusions to Cain and Abel and the burning bush), and even beyond them. Throughout, there is enough room between the two worlds of story that they can both share the allegorical ground, and allow the reader to fill in the rest of the space themselves.

The real dilemma of A Children’s Bible is that there is no divine presence or wise figure to lead the children through disaster. There’s only a group of parents who do little more than down cocktails and offer vague, grossly inadequate solutions to the mounting problems. It’s clear pretty much from the beginning that the children are essentially on their own. They even have a game of keeping it secret whose parents are whose, denying their connection to them.


The generational conflict is the fulcrum of the story; the enemy is not so much the destruction of Earth, but the parents’ inability to do anything. Because who caused the destruction in the first place? The same people who now sit in the middle of the mess they wrought, scheduling their days around drinking times, worried the catastrophe means they might run out of Bulleit bourbon.

Millet’s use of the collective first-person and collective group identity in general is extremely skillful. Each group is an archetype: the Old and the New. The division underpins the allegorical dimension of the novel; individuals are defined largely by their group, yet maintain distinct personalities.


Leave the World Behind doesn’t emphasize generational conflict as much, but it’s certainly present. There are only two sets of parents holed up in a vacation house during the apocalypse, instead of a large group, but these parents could easily fit in with the parents in A Children’s Bible. They drink a lot (never have two books given me such an awareness of the widespread use of alcohol as a marker of emotional immaturity), and generally don’t seem to know very much.


In Leave the World Behind, the point seems to be that, if and when disaster strikes, the vast majority of us (or at least adults) will have no idea what to do. Unnerved by news of a widespread power outage, the father in the story drives from his secluded vacation spot in the middle of nowhere to find some answers, and immediately gets lost. Like, immediately. His character is so unsympathetic that I almost got annoyed; it seemed too easy to dismiss him. The wife, similarly, is narcissistic and insecure, and seems incapable of anything except the most basic functions of parenting (or maybe not, if the story runs its course). Alam’s story seems to imply that the children might turn out the same way, but there is a possibility that they will avoid this fate (and that’s all I’ll say, to avoid spoiling anything).


In A Children’s Bible, the parents are dismissed – by the stand-in for the reader, Eve, and the rest of the young people. Their contempt for their parents is palpable on nearly every page. In one conversation they explicitly ask the parents: why didn’t you do anything? It’s the exact same thing Greta Thunberg angrily demands on the world stage. In the novel, the moment feels almost too on-the-nose, descending from the heights of symbolism into literal representation; it makes me wonder if other young people are asking their parents this question so directly, or whether they just don’t bother. The young people in A Children’s Bible alternate between dismissing the parents and feeling angry or disappointed in them.


I have spent a non-negligible amount of time considering these questions myself. What does the older generation owe the younger generation? What is reasonable to expect from our parents? By the end of A Children’s Bible, Eve ends up concluding the same thing I did: you cannot blame the parents for behaving in the ways they were adapted for. “They’d functioned passably in a limited domain. Specifically adapted to life in their own small niches,” says Eve. “When their habitats collapsed they had no familiar terrain. No map. No equipment. No tools.” This is the same picture of reality that I came to myself, though not nearly at such a young age as Eve. It reminded me of the song “Going Nowhere,” which was sung so memorably by Lena Zavaroni and written by Neil Sedaka, with the lyrics:


And they’re asked to hold the world together
Make it happen
Give it children
Who in turn are turning on to going nowhere
And all the strength they’d ever need to help them
Has been wasted
Remains hidden
In the confusion of going nowhere


The parents’ generation learned to thrive in a consumerist environment, and taught their children how to adapt to a middle-class existence based on the idea of wealth as worth (Millet’s characters fret about money at the most inappropriate, ridiculous times). This “nowhere” of the ideal materialistic life took all their energy to accomplish, and still it results mostly in confusion and need for escape.


But these days, I find it increasingly nonsensical to blame anyone, even a large group of people with so much of the political power, for our current predicament. Humans adapt to the circumstances we were raised in. The fact is that the current change in circumstances might be faster than what our species can adapt to. Is that anyone’s fault? It feels less stressful for me, anyway, to view it as something that is simply happening, like every other natural process.


The dangers and problems of thousands of generations were the same: get enough to eat, gather wealth to ensure survival, avoid disease and poverty, etc. Those were challenge enough for us for the vast majority of our history. In the last few decades, the demands of the environment have shifted to require us to think globally, as a species, not as tribes. We find ourselves having to strategize on the macro level, having to understand massive, inter-connected chains of cause-and-effect, and having to adapt our behavior to these large, nearly incomprehensible systems. This means we have to share knowledge, think about indirect effects of our actions, and even consider impacts several places down the chain of cause-and-effect. How can we transition to this kind of thinking in the space of one generation? It’s a huge order. It’s not impossible, and certainly there were people in the previous generations who were ready for it, but apparently extremely unlikely for a species to adapt this quickly.


If the parents were able to defend themselves, they might argue that you can’t set down the rules of the game for a generation of people and then, after they’ve been following them for fifty or sixty years, suddenly say that they should have been doing this other thing the whole time. I’m not saying this is good, or bodes well for our species, but it just seems to be the fact staring us in the face. Ultimately, all the adults in A Children’s Bible fail to function in the new world left after environmental catastrophe. They learned to serve their function in the post-war consumer boom, and now that that world has fallen apart, there’s simply nothing for them to do, no way to develop themselves in this new world order.


All of this is wrapped up in A Children’s Bible as part of the story, organically you might say; there is no repetitive, critical preaching, as I felt there was in Leave the World Behind. It does seem fairly obvious to me, at this point, to show that most of us would be high and dry if all-out disaster befell us; haven’t we learned that well enough by the end of 2020? Certainly, it’s worth pointing out past failures to avoid repeating them, but dwelling on blame and anger begins a cycle of self-serving contempt that saps our energy.
If we can accept without judgment that humans adapt to certain systems and don’t do well when those systems break down, we can start to rethink those systems together. We see this beginning to happen at the end of A Children’s Bible, which moves on from its judgment of the previous generation to the problems at hand in the present, and the future.